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Abstract
Trade negotiations occur through time and between the governments of
many countries. An important issue is thus whether the value of concessions
that a government wins in a current negotiation may be eroded in a future
bilateral negotiation to which it is not party. We identify rules of negotiation
that serve to protect the welfare of governments that are not participating in
the bilateral negotiation. Our main …nding is that the two central principles
of GATT/WTO - non-discrimination (MFN) and reciprocity - preserve the
welfare of non-participating governments and therefore o¤er a “…rst-line of
defense” against bilateral opportunism. We argue that the GATT/WTO
nulli…cation-or-impairment rule then constitutes an important “second-line
of defense.” Finally, we con…rm that in the absence of rules, or under
weaker rules (e.g., MFN alone), the potential for bilateral opportunism can
be severe.
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1. Introduction
For over 50 years, GATT and now the WTO have successfully encouraged multi-
lateral trade liberalization. This liberalization has been accomplished through a
series of agreements negotiated among the member countries, and an important
role of GATT/WTO has been to provide a continuous negotiating forum for this
purpose. Each of these agreements amounts to a web of bilateral reciprocal ex-
changes of market access concessions between negotiating governments, secured
by commitments to reduce tari¤s and other trade barriers, and “multilateralized”
by the most-favored-nation (MFN) rule, which requires that each member o¤er
to every other member access to its markets on non-discriminatory terms (see
Jackson, 1969, pp. 217-248, or Hoekman and Kostecki, 1995, pp. 56-83).
The liberalization that has been achieved through GATT/WTO negotiations
is especially noteworthy in light of the fact that negotiations occur through time
between the governments of various countries. This feature raises the possibility
that the market access implied by existing tari¤ commitments may be altered
by tari¤ commitments made at some point in the future. A particular concern
is that the value of concessions that a government wins today may be eroded in
a future bilateral negotiation to which it is not party. Taking the argument a
step further, if governments recognize that current market access relations may
be vulnerable to opportunistic bilateral agreements in the future, then they may
exchange concessions with trepidation. A multilateral trade organization like the
GATT/WTO is thus more likely to achieve its objectives, if it includes rules
of negotiation that serve to protect the value of previous concessions won by
governments that are not participating in current bilateral negotiations.
As a general matter, then, it is important to ask: How e¤ective are the
GATT/WTO principles that govern bilateral negotiations in protecting the wel-
fare of non-participating governments? In this paper, we present a modeling
framework within which to address this question, and we focus on three key
GATT/WTO principles: non-discrimination, reciprocity and “nulli…cation or im-
pairment.”
The principle of non-discrimination is a …rst pillar of the GATT/WTO ar-
chitecture. With certain exceptions (notably, preferential trading agreements, as
allowed under GATT Article XXIV), this principle requires that tari¤ reductions
achieved through a bilateral agreement are extended on an MFN basis to non-
participants. Schwartz and Sykes (1997) consider the various costs and bene…ts
of the MFN rule, and argue that the main bene…t is that it protects the value of
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concessions:
“More important, the MFN obligation protects the value of concessions against
future erosion through discrimination. If country A receives a concession from
country B and is not entitled to MFN treatment from B, then the value of the
concession can be undermined if country B later makes an even better concession
to country C on the same goods (or close substitutes). Faced with this uncertainty,
country A would o¤er less for the concession in the …rst place (as would country
B for the reciprocal concession), and fewer valuable deals would be struck.” (p.
62)
While the MFN rule can clearly o¤er protection of this kind, it remains to deter-
mine formally whether this rule fully eliminates the opportunism problem.
The second pillar of the GATT/WTO architecture is the principle of reci-
procity. Under this principle, negotiations result in tari¤ adjustments that gener-
ate for each participant an equal change in the volume of its imports and exports.1
This principle is often denounced as re‡ecting unsound mercantilist reasoning.
But in fact it can promote e¢cient trade agreements, as it serves to …x the world
price between negotiating partners, so that neither partner experiences a terms-
of-trade loss when tari¤s are reciprocally liberalized.
The third rule that warrants attention here is the nulli…cation-or-impairment
rule. GATT Dispute Panels have consistently recognized that the value of a tari¤
concession is the improved market access which it represents. Accordingly, when
a government takes some action that nulli…es or impairs a previous concession
made to some trading partner, that partner has a potentially legitimate basis from
which to …le a complaint, even if no violation of GATT/WTO rules is alleged.2
1The principle of reciprocity is represented in GATT/WTO practice in two ways. First, it is
often associated with the broad manner in which government negotiators approach trade-policy
negotiations. Second, it appears in GATT articles (e. g., GATT Article XXVIII) as a means
of determining the “compensation” that may be sought when a trading partner modi…es or
withdraws a previous concession. We discuss the history and legal representation of reciprocity
in detail elsewhere (Bagwell and Staiger, 2000).
2This view is exempli…ed by the following excerpt from a GATT panel report (concerning
the US non-violation complaint regarding EEC subsidies for domestic oilseed producers):
“...the main value of a tari¤ concession is that it provides an assurance of better market access
through improved price competition. Contracting parties negotiate tari¤ concessions primarily
to obtain that advantage. They must therefore be assumed to base their tari¤ negotiations on
the expectation that the price e¤ect of the tari¤ concessions will not be systematically o¤set.
If no right of redress were given to them in such a case, they would be reluctant to make tari¤
concessions and the General Agreement would no longer be useful as a legal framework for
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As Petersmann (1997) details, these complaints are handled under GATT Arti-
cle XXIII, and the three conditions established by dispute panels for a successful
“non-violation” complaint of this kind are that: (1). a reciprocal concession was
negotiated between two trading partners; (2). a subsequent action was taken by
one government, which, though consistent with GATT articles, adversely a¤ected
the market access a¤orded to its trading partner; and (3). this action could not
have been reasonably anticipated by this partner at the time of the negotiation of
the original tari¤ concession. There are a variety of actions that have instigated
complaints, including domestic subsidies, product re-classi…cations, changing reg-
ulatory regimes and bilateral trade negotiations with other partners. We focus on
the latter possibility here.3
To assess the extent to which these rules prevent opportunistic bilateral agree-
ments, we develop a general-equilibrium modeling framework in which a home
country exports one good to two foreign countries in exchange for imports from
them of a second good. We represent the objectives of each government as a
general function of its local prices and terms of trade. This approach o¤ers two
important advantages. First, it is very general, including both the traditional
representation in which governments maximize national income and the recent
political-economy formulations in which governments are also sensitive to distri-
butional issues. Second, this representation clari…es the channel through which
one government’s tari¤ choices impose an externality on another government’s
welfare, making transparent both the means through which negotiating govern-
ments may appropriate the welfare of a non-participating government and the
manner in which various rules of negotiation may limit this endeavor.
We then develop our analysis of the featured GATT/WTO rules in three steps.
First, we consider whether the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination
combine to ensure the preservation of the welfare of a non-participating gov-
ernment. This marks a useful initial step, since the potential for opportunistic
bilateral agreements is surely eliminated, if participating governments are unable
even to alter non-participant welfare.
In this regard, we begin with a theoretical perspective and establish that the
welfare of the non-participating government is preserved if its country’s terms
incorporating the results of trade negotiations.” (as quoted in Petersmann, 1997, p. 168)
3Examples of bilateral agreements that have led to non-violation nulli…cation-or-impairment
complaints are (i). the US complaint regarding tari¤ preferences negotiated by the EC on citrus
products from certain Mediterranean countries, and (ii). the EC complaint regarding aspects of
the bilateral agreement between the US and Japan concerning trade in semi-conductor products.
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of trade (equivalently, export and import volumes) are unaltered. This …nding
extends the logic of the well-known Kemp-Wan (1976) theorem to settings with
politically motivated governments that construct bilateral (but not necessarily
free-trade) agreements.
We next show that neither reciprocity nor non-discrimination is su¢cient, on
its own, to preserve the welfare of the non-participating government. As our
main …nding, however, we establish that the welfare of the non-participating gov-
ernment is preserved, when a bilateral agreement must honor reciprocity and
non-discrimination. The principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination there-
fore eliminate the potential for opportunistic bilateral agreements. The intuition
is remarkably simple. Reciprocity ensures that the terms of trade are …xed be-
tween the participating governments, and under non-discrimination this implies
in turn that the non-participant’s terms of trade are also preserved.
Having shown that the rigid application of reciprocity and MFN ensures the
preservation of non-participant welfare and is thus su¢cient to preclude oppor-
tunistic bilateral agreements, we may still ask: Are these rules really necessary?
Put di¤erently, if there were weaker, or even no, rules that governed bilateral
negotiations, so that non-participant welfare could be altered, would there ex-
ist a permitted bilateral agreement that resulted in lower welfare for the non-
participating government and higher welfare for each participating government?
The examination of this issue constitutes the second step of our analysis.
To begin, we suppose that bilateral negotiations are conducted in the absence
of rules. We illustrate that the potential for bilateral opportunism is then perva-
sive: starting from any initial set of e¢cient tari¤s, and holding …xed the tari¤
policy of foreign country j, the home country and foreign country i can always
…nd a way to negotiate further changes in their tari¤s on each other’s imports
which bene…t them at the expense of country j. In this sense, when rules are
absent, every e¢cient tari¤ vector is vulnerable to bilateral opportunism. The
key point is that, by lowering the tari¤s that they apply to one another, the gov-
ernments of the home country and foreign country i cause a terms of trade loss
for foreign country j. The governments of the home country and foreign country
i then convert this loss into their own gain.
As a general matter, we show that this maneuver cannot be stopped by a
reciprocity rule alone: provided that discrimination is allowed, there exists a
wide range of e¢cient tari¤s from which the home country and foreign country
i can liberalize further in accordance with reciprocity and gain at the expense of
country j. Hence, under the reciprocity rule, a signi…cant set of e¢cient tari¤s is
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vulnerable to bilateral opportunism.
Next, we consider the potential for bilateral opportunism under the MFN
rule. We …nd that the MFN rule alone cannot o¤er a full remedy to the bilateral
opportunism problem: for a wide range of initial MFN-e¢cient tari¤s, the home
country and foreign country i can …nd a way to negotiate further changes in their
tari¤s on each other’s exports which bene…t them at the expense of country j -
even when the home-country tari¤ cut is extended under the MFN rule to the non-
participating foreign country j. Intuitively, the tari¤ reduction given by foreign
country i raises the cost of home exports in foreign country j, and this negative
e¤ect may overwhelm the bene…cial e¤ect of a reduced home tari¤ on exports
from foreign country j. Under the MFN rule, therefore, a signi…cant set of MFN-
e¢cient tari¤s is vulnerable to bilateral opportunism. With the second step of
our analysis, we thus con…rm that, while reciprocity and non-discrimination can
together solve the bilateral opportunism problem, neither alone will su¢ce.
Finally, while we model MFN and reciprocity as formal and rigid rules, their
application in GATT/WTO practice is more quali…ed. This brings us to the
third and …nal step of our analysis: we consider whether the nulli…cation-or-
impairment rule might provide a separate defense against bilateral opportunism,
even when the reciprocity and MFN rules are not imposed. To this end, we
propose a de…nition of market access and show that this is the case: starting from
an e¢cient set of tari¤s, any bilateral agreement that is attractive to the home
country and foreign country i would violate the nulli…cation-or-impairment rule.
We therefore provide a formal basis from which to interpret the nulli…cation-or-
impairment rule as playing a potentially important role in solving the bilateral
opportunism problem. But the nulli…cation-or-impairment rule would by itself be
a cumbersome solution to a (pervasive) problem. With this observation in mind,
we propose that MFN and reciprocity be understood in GATT/WTO practice as
providing a “…rst line of defense” against the problem of bilateral opportunism,
thereby reducing the number of valid non-violation complaints and easing the
judicial burden of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures. The ability
of governments to bring non-violation nulli…cation-or-violation complaints then
serves an important role as a “second line of defense” against this problem.4
4The broad notion that explicit GATT/WTO rules serve as a primary guard against the
erosion of concessions, and that non-violation complaints provide a useful but secondary backup
procedure, is well-re‡ected in the writings of GATT/WTO legal scholars. For example, Pe-
tersmann (1997, p. 136) observes that “...the function of most GATT rules (such as Articles
I-III and XI) is to establish conditions of competition and to protect trading opportunities...”,
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This paper builds on our previous work. In Bagwell and Staiger (1999a, 2001a),
we represent each government’s objective as a general function of its local prices
and terms of trade, and we establish that the principles of non-discrimination
and reciprocity can promote e¢cient trade agreements, by neutralizing the terms-
of-trade implications of trade-policy changes.5 In Bagwell and Staiger (2001b),
we extend the framework to include labor and environmental standards, and we
analyze the extent to which the nulli…cation-or-impairment rule guards against a
regulatory race-to-the-bottom. The innovation of the present paper is that we in-
troduce and study the bilateral opportunism problem. We establish that the prin-
ciples of non-discrimination and reciprocity and the nulli…cation-or-impairment
rule o¤er important protection against opportunistic bilateral agreements.
This paper is also related to an important literature in Industrial Organization
that considers multi-party negotiations and the protection against opportunistic
behavior that di¤erent legal rules o¤er.6 We demonstrate here that a related
concern arises in the context of trade-policy negotiations, and we identify and
evaluate the protection o¤ered by key GATT rules.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3
contains the welfare-preservation …ndings. Section 4 characterizes e¢cient tari¤s
in discriminatory environments, identi…es in the no-rules case a severe bilateral
opportunism problem, and shows that reciprocity alone does not provide a general
solution to this problem. Section 5 considers an MFN environment and con…rms
that, without further rules, the problem of bilateral opportunism remains. Sec-
tion 6 shows that the nulli…cation-or-impairment rule can in principle provide a
separate defense against the bilateral opportunism problem. Section 7 concludes.
and then concludes his review of the 14 dispute settlement reports examining non-violation
complaints as follows: “...These panel reports illustrated that the non-violation complaints can
strengthen the function of GATT, as well as of the WTO, as a negotiating forum by o¤ering ad-
ditional safeguards against the impairment of...market access commitments through unforeseen
subsequent policy measures that are not prohibited by GATT/WTO law.” (p. 171).
5Given the central role played by the MFN rule in the GATT/WTO, there is surprisingly
little formal analysis of this rule. For additional perspectives, see Bagwell and Staiger (1999b),
Caplin and Krishna (1991), Choi (1995), Ludema (1991) and McCalman (1997). None of these
papers consider the bilateral opportunism problem. Ethier (1998) independently raises some of
the issues treated here. Horn and Mavroidis (2001) o¤er an excellent survey of research that
addresses the economic aspects of the MFN rule.
6For example, McAfee and Schwartz (1994) and Segal (1999) consider the scope for bilateral
opportunism, when a single seller contracts separately with di¤erent buyers. Non-discrimination
clauses may mitigate against the bilateral opportunism problem.
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2. The Model
In this section, we describe a two-good general-equilibriummodel of trade between
three countries.7 We present as well a general set of preferences for governments
that allows for both economic and political considerations.
2.1. The Economic Environment
We assume that there is one home country and two foreign countries who trade
two goods, x and y, that are normal goods in consumption and produced under
conditions of increasing opportunity costs. Production takes place under perfect
competition, facing tari¤s on imports by each country. To simplify the exposi-
tion of our …ndings, we suppose that each foreign country trades only with the
home country, who imports x from each of its two foreign trading partners in
exchange for exports of y. The home country is thus the only country that has
the opportunity to set discriminatory tari¤s across its trading partners.8
We now introduce price notation. The home local relative price is denoted as
p ´ px=py, where px (py) is the local price of good x (y) in the home country.
Similarly, the local relative price in foreign country i is denoted as p¤i ´ p¤ix =p¤iy
for i = 1,2. The ad valorem tari¤ that the home country places on imports of x
from foreign country i is denoted as ti, for i= 1,2, and t¤i is the ad valorem tari¤
levied by foreign country i on imports of y from the home country.9 Throughout,
we assume that these tari¤s are non-prohibitive. We de…ne the “world” (i.e.,
untaxed) relative price for trade between the home country and foreign country i
as pwi ´ p¤ix =py: This is the ratio of exporter prices for trade between the home
country and foreign country i. Letting ¿ i ´ (1+ti) and ¿ ¤i ´ (1+t¤i), we then may
represent local prices in terms of world prices and tari¤s: p = ¿ ipwi ´ p(¿ i; pwi)
7This model is developed in further detail in the Appendix.
8This trading pattern arises when the home (each foreign) country is a natural importer of
x (y), provided that discriminatory tari¤s do not upset the natural pattern of trade. The latter
is assured, e.g., if transportation costs between foreign countries are large as compared to the
extent of discrimination in home tari¤s, and indeed all of our propositions hold when there
is a (iceberg) transportation cost associated with trade between the foreign countries. More
generally, our assumptions serve only to ensure that it is possible for the home country to set
discriminatory tari¤s without prohibiting trade between it and its less-favored trading partner.
We discuss a many-good extension in our working paper (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999c), in which
trade between foreign countries might occur as well even absent discriminatory tari¤s at home.
9The Lerner symmetry theorem ensures that trade taxes or subsidies can be equivalently
depicted as applying to exports or to imports in this two-sector general-equilibrium setting.
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and p¤i = pwi=¿ ¤i ´ p¤i(¿¤i; pwi): As these expressions indicate, local prices are
determined, once tari¤s and world prices are given.
It is important to observe that world prices are linked across bilateral trading
relationships:
pwi = [¿ j=¿ i]pwj (2.1)
One possibility is that the tari¤ policy of the home country is non-discriminatory
(i.e., the home country adopts MFN tari¤s). In this case, we have that ¿1 = ¿2
and hence there is a single world price: pwi ´ pw for i = 1,2. On the other hand,
if the home country discriminates with its tari¤ policy, then ¿1 6= ¿2 and hence
there are di¤erent world prices: pw1 6= pw2: Finally, we note that the terms of
trade for foreign country i are given simply as pwi:
We next introduce notation for import and export volumes in each country.
For foreign country i, imports of y and exports of x are denoted as M¤i(p¤i; pwi)
and E¤i(p¤i; pwi), respectively: These functions represent di¤erences between pro-
duction and consumption in foreign country i, where production depends upon
the local price while consumption is determined by the local price and also tari¤
revenue, where tari¤ revenue can itself be expressed as a function of the local price
and the terms of trade.
The home country has multiple trading partners, with whom it may experience
di¤erent terms of trade. Once again, domestic production depends upon the
local price while domestic consumption is determined by the local price and tari¤
revenue. But the determination of tari¤ revenue is now more complex: if the
home country’s tari¤s are discriminatory, then its tari¤ revenue depends upon
the total volume of x that it imports and the composition of this volume across
the foreign trading partners. As we show in the Appendix, we may again express
tari¤ revenue in terms of the local price and the terms of trade, once the domestic
country’s multilateral terms of trade is appropriately de…ned as a trade-weighted
average of the set of bilateral world prices:
T (p¤1; p¤2; pw1; pw2) ´ X
i=1;2
s¤i(p¤1; p¤2; pw1; pw2) ¢ pwi;
where
s¤i(p¤1; p¤2; pw1; pw2) ´ E¤i(p¤i; pwi)= X
j=1;2
E¤j(p¤j; pwj):
With this de…nition, home-country imports of x and exports of y may be denoted
as M(p; T ) and E(p; T ); respectively. Henceforth, we refer to T simply as the
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home country’s terms of trade.10 Using (2.1), if the home country adopts an MFN
tari¤ policy, then T = pwi ´ pw; however, a discriminatory tari¤ policy implies
that T 6= pwi for all i.
Next, we consider the trade balance and market-clearing conditions. Home
and foreign budget constraints imply that, for any prices, we have
T ¢M(p; T ) = E(p; T ) (2.2)
and
M¤i(p¤i; pwi) = pwi ¢E¤i(p¤i; pwi); i = 1; 2: (2.3)
We now suppose that the vector of tari¤s, ¿ ´ (¿1; ¿ 2; ¿¤1; ¿¤2), is given, and we
consider the determination of the world prices. One restriction on world prices is
given by the market-clearing requirement:




Combining the market-clearing requirement (2.4) with the linkage condition (2.1),
we thus have two restrictions with which to determine the two equilibrium world
prices as functions of the given tari¤s. We represent the equilibriumworld prices asepwi(¿ ) for i = 1; 2, and we assume that they are uniquely determined as functions
of the four tari¤s. Notice that market clearing in the y market is assured by (2.2)
and (2.3). Summarizing, with their selections of tari¤s, governments determine
the equilibrium world prices; in turn, the tari¤s and equilibrium world prices
imply equilibrium values for all local prices, so that equilibrium import and export
volumes are determined as well.
2.2. Prices and Tari¤s
It is convenient now to present some basic assumptions that we maintain through-
out the paper. We begin with the manner in which tari¤s a¤ect prices. We
consider both the possibility that the home country is able to set discriminatory
tari¤s and the possibility that home tari¤s must conform to the MFN rule.
Beginning with the discriminatory case, we impose the following assumptions:
(i). epw1 is increasing in ¿2; ¿¤1 and ¿¤2 and is decreasing in ¿ 1; and (ii). epw2
10Observe that T is in fact a measure of the reciprocal of domestic terms of trade: an im-
provement in the domestic country’s terms of trade corresponds to a lower value for T .
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is increasing in ¿ 1; ¿¤1 and ¿ ¤2 and is decreasing in ¿ 2: Thus, if foreign country
i confronts a higher tari¤ on its exports, then it experiences a reduction in its
terms of trade. On the other hand, if foreign country i raises its own tari¤, or if
the other countries raise tari¤s on one another, then foreign country i experiences
an improvement in its terms of trade. These restrictions direct attention to the
“standard” case, ensuring that our model does not succumb to the Lerner paradox.
Next, we consider the case in which the home country selects among MFN
tari¤s: ¿ ´ ¿ 1 = ¿2. In this event, we may represent the equilibrium world
price as epw(¿ ; ¿ ¤1; ¿ ¤2). Our assumption for this case is: epw is increasing in ¿ ¤1
and ¿ ¤2 and is decreasing in ¿ . As above, when foreign country i raises its own
import tari¤, or when foreign country j pursues a more protectionist policy, foreign
country i experiences a terms of trade improvement. We assume further that an
increase in the home (MFN) tari¤ results in an improvement in the home-country
terms of trade.
2.3. Government Preferences
We next o¤er a general representation of government preferences. We equip gov-
ernment decision-makers with preferences that allow for a wide range of economic
and political motivations. In particular, we represent the objectives of the home
and foreign governments by the general functions W (p; T ) and W ¤i(p¤i; epwi) for i
= 1,2, where all prices and terms of trade are evaluated at their market-clearing
levels. The basic assumption that we maintain is that, with local prices held
…xed, each government strictly prefers an improvement in its terms of trade:
@W (p; T )=@T < 0 and @W ¤i(p¤i; epwi)=@pwi > 0.
To understand this assumption, it is useful to refer to Figure 1. There, we
depict combinations of ¿ i and ¿¤i that preserve the relative local price in foreign
country i and the world price between it and the home country. Given the re-
lationships between prices and tari¤s detailed above, the iso-world-price locus is
positively sloped. For this illustration, we suppose further that an increase in
¿ ¤i results in a decrease in the local relative price in this country.11 Now, let
us suppose that we begin at point A. If the home country were to raise ¿ i at
the same time that foreign country i were to lower ¿ ¤i, with the respective tar-
i¤ changes undertaken in a fashion that preserved p¤i, then we would arrive at
point B. Notice that the world price epwi is lower at point B: our assumption that
@W ¤i(p¤i; epwi)=@pwi > 0 simply means that the implied income redistribution from
11In other words, local relative prices do not succumb to the Metzler paradox.
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foreign country i to the home country (associated with the movement from A to
B) results in a loss of welfare for the government of foreign country i.
We emphasize that, as preferences over local prices are left unrestricted, this
representation of government preferences is very general. It includes the standard
possibility that governments maximize national income as well as the possibility
that governments are motivated by distributional concerns. As we detail in our
earlier work (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999a), the leading political-economy models
of trade policy can all be captured within this formulation.12
3. Welfare Preservation
An important issue concerns the extent to which GATT/WTO rules prevent an
opportunistic bilateral agreement. In this section, we take a …rst step in the inves-
tigation of this issue, by identifying rules on bilateral negotiations that preserve
the welfare of the non-participating government. We also relate these rules to
GATT/WTO practice.
Formally, we focus here on the following problem. Starting from an initial
set of tari¤s, ¿ I ´ (¿ 1I ; ¿ 2I ; ¿ ¤1I ; ¿ ¤2I ); suppose that the governments of the home
country and foreign country i enter into a bilateral negotiation that results in a
new set of tari¤s, ¿N ´ (¿1N ; ¿ 2N ; ¿¤1N ; ¿¤2N ), where ¿¤jI = ¿ ¤jN since the tari¤ of the
non-participating country is outside of the bilateral negotiation. Let epwjI (epwjN )
denote the equilibrium value of pwj under the initial (new) set of tari¤s; likewise,
let p¤jI = epwjI =¿¤jI (p¤jN = epwjN =¿ ¤jI ) denote the local price in foreign country j under
the initial (new) set of tari¤s. We seek rules on the manner that ¿N may be
derived from ¿ I and under which the welfare of the non-participating government
is unaltered: W ¤j(p¤jI ; epwjI ) = W ¤j(p¤jN ; epwjN ):
3.1. Terms of Trade
It might be expected that a welfare-preservation rule could be de…ned only with
reference to the particular preferences held by the government of foreign country
j. This is not the case, however, as the following proposition con…rms:
12As Baldwin (1987) notes, the political-economy models of trade policy proposed by Ol-
son (1965), Caves (1976), Brock and Magee (1978), Findlay and Wellisz (1982), Feenstra and
Bhagwati (1982) and Hillman (1982) all …t within this approach. Likewise, Mayer’s (1984)
median-voter model, the lobbying models of Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995) and Dixit,
Grossman and Helpman (1997), and Baldwin’s (1985) political-constraint model can all be rep-
resented with government preferences of this form.
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Proposition 1 (Welfare Preservation: Terms of Trade): Any bilateral
agreement between the governments of the home country and foreign country i
that leaves unaltered foreign country j ’s terms of trade also preserves the welfare
of the government of foreign country j .
To see the argument, observe thatW ¤j(p¤j; epwj) is preserved when p¤j and epwj are
unaltered. Proposition 1 posits that epwjI = epwjN , and with ¿¤j …xed it then follows
as well that p¤jI = p
¤j
N :
The problem of non-participant welfare preservation thus may be recast in
terms of the preservation of the non-participant’s world price. We argue next
that the problem equivalently may be recast in terms of the preservation of the
non-participant’s export and import volumes. Speci…cally, we observe that the
bilateral negotiation preserves foreign country j’s terms of trade (epwjI = epwjN ) if
and only if it preserves foreign country j’s export and import volumes:
E¤j(p¤jI ; epwjI ) = E¤j(p¤jN ; epwjN ) and M¤j(p¤jI ; epwjI ) =M¤j(p¤jN ; epwjN ) (3.1)
Given ¿ ¤jI = ¿
¤j
N ; it is direct that epwjI = epwjN implies (3.1). Going the other way,
if the bilateral negotiation satis…es (3.1), then the trade balance condition (2.3)
for the non-participating country j ensures that epwjI = epwjN . We may thus restate
Proposition 1 as:
Proposition 2 (Welfare Preservation: Export and Import Volumes):
Any bilateral agreement between the governments of the home country and foreign
country i that leaves unaltered foreign country j ’s export and import volumes
equivalently leaves unaltered foreign country j ’s terms of trade and thus also pre-
serves the welfare of the government of foreign country j .
Kemp and Wan (1976) make related observations, although they restrict at-
tention to governments that maximize national income and negotiate bilaterally
to free trade. As others have noted in this context, the practical merit of a rule
that calls for world-price maintenance is not obvious.13 Such a rule might require
subtle adjustments in the tari¤ that the home country applies to exports from the
non-participating country. At this point, Propositions 1 and 2 are best understood
as o¤ering theoretical insights that inform our search for welfare-preservation rules
that have a …rm grounding in GATT/WTO practice.
13See, e.g., the discussion in McMillan (1993), Srinivasan (1998) and Winters (1997).
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3.2. Reciprocity and MFN
Two of the central pillars of the GATT/WTO approach are the principles of
reciprocity and non-discrimination. We consider now the extent to which these
principles protect the welfare of a non-participating government.
We begin with the principle of reciprocity. Following our earlier work (Bag-
well and Staiger, 1999a, 2001a), we say that a bilateral negotiation between the
governments of the home country and foreign country i conforms to the principle
of reciprocity whenever for each of these countries the change in the volume of its
imports is of equal value to the change in the volume of its exports, where changes
in trade volumes are valued at the existing world price. For foreign country i, the
principle of reciprocity thus requires that:
M¤i(p¤iN ; epwiN )¡M¤i(p¤iI ; epwiI ) = epwiI ¢ [E¤i(p¤iN ; epwiN )¡ E¤i(p¤iI ; epwiI )]: (3.2)
We now record an important property of reciprocity:
Lemma 1. Any bilateral agreement between the governments of the home country
and foreign country i that satis…es the principle of reciprocity leaves unaltered the
terms of trade between these countries.
The proof is simple. Since foreign country i’s trade balance condition must hold at
the initial tari¤s, we may apply (2.3) to (3.2) and restate the reciprocity require-
ment as M¤i(p¤iN ; epwiN ) = epwiI ¢ E¤i(p¤iN ; epwiN ): But foreign country i’s trade balance
requirement must hold also at the new tari¤s, and so it follows that epwiI = epwiN :
Any bilateral negotiation that satis…es the principle of reciprocity thus pre-
serves the world price between the negotiating governments. But the principle of
reciprocity does not, on its own, ensure that the welfare of the non-participating
government is preserved. Reciprocity …xes the world price epwi; whereas the wel-
fare of the government of foreign country j is preserved when the world price epwj
is …xed.
Similarly, the principle of non-discrimination does not, on its own, su¢ce to
preserve the welfare of the non-participating government. As mentioned in Section
2, under the MFN requirement, the government of the home country sets a single
tari¤ on both of its trading partners, and a single world price, epwk ´ epw1k = epw2k ,
where k = I;N , is thus determined. But the governments of the home country and
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foreign country i could potentially engage in a bilateral negotiation that changes
this world price: epwN 6= epwI . In this case, their bilateral negotiation could alter the
welfare of the government of foreign country j.
Finally, suppose that the bilateral negotiation between the governments of the
home country and foreign country i must satisfy both the principles of reciprocity
and non-discrimination. Then, reciprocity …xes the world price between the ne-
gotiating countries; which under the MFN requirement ensures as well that the
non-participant’s world price is …xed.
Proposition 3 (Welfare Preservation: Reciprocity and MFN): Any bilat-
eral agreement between the governments of the home country and foreign country
i that satis…es the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination leaves unal-
tered foreign country j ’s terms of trade and therefore preserves the welfare of the
government of foreign country j .
In e¤ect, reciprocity and MFN work in tandem to maintain the export and
import volumes of the non-participating country. As noted above, an explicit
volume-preservation rule could be cumbersome, as it is suggestive of subtle ad-
justments in the tari¤ that the home government applies to the non-participant.
By contrast, the MFN restriction serves as a simple means by which to “multilat-
eralize” bilateral negotiations, and, remarkably, reciprocity then ensures that the
multilateral presence so achieved preserves non-participant welfare.
3.3. Remaining Issues
To this point, we have focused on rules for bilateral negotiation that preserve the
welfare of a non-participating government. The tandem rules of reciprocity and
non-discrimination have this welfare-preservation property, and they are therefore
su¢cient to preclude opportunistic bilateral agreements. An important remaining
issue concerns the probable extent to which these rules are necessary.
Our investigation of this issue constitutes the second step in our analysis. We
proceed by asking two questions. First, in the absence of any rules for bilat-
eral negotiation, would there exist bilateral agreements that lower the welfare
of the non-participating government and are attractive to the participating gov-
ernments? In other words, how signi…cant is the bilateral opportunism problem,
anyway? Second, even if the problem is signi…cant in the absence of rules, might
it nevertheless be solved with “weak” rules (i.e., rules that do not go so far as to
ensure the preservation of non-participant welfare)? For instance, as Schwartz and
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Sykes (1997) suggest, it seems plausible that the principle of non-discrimination
would constitute an e¤ective solution to any such problem. But does it? In partic-
ular, if any bilateral negotiation were required only to honor the MFN rule, would
there exist bilateral agreements that lower the welfare of the non-participating
government and are attractive to the participating governments?
Conclusive answers to these questions are beyond the reach of any single model.
As a general matter, the bene…ts to a bilateral agreement may be in‡uenced by
the position of the initial tari¤s and by the participants’ beliefs regarding the
possible responses and/or agreements that a non-participating government might
pursue in the future.14 Nevertheless, we may gain some insight by characterizing
the e¢ciency frontier, positioning the initial tari¤s on this frontier, specifying the
rules (if any) that govern bilateral negotiations, and then asking: Does there exist
a permitted bilateral agreement for the governments of the home country and any
foreign country i under which they each gain, when they take as …xed the tari¤
policy of foreign country j?
A convenient feature of this approach is that, if such an agreement does exist,
then it is assuredly opportunistic: starting at the e¢ciency frontier, the partici-
pating governments can gain only if the non-participating government is harmed.
A limitation is that the non-participant’s eventual response to the bilateral agree-
ment is not modeled. On net, we believe that this approach represents a useful
beginning towards an understanding of the potential signi…cance of the bilateral
opportunism problem when rules are absent or weak.15
14A complete analysis would therefore specify the determination of the initial tari¤s and the
dynamic process through which coalitions endogenously form. The ideal modeling framework
would be a repeated game, since trade agreements must be self enforcing, that allows for endoge-
nous coalition formation over time. At present, however, there is no widely accepted theory of
endogenous coalition formation among farsighted players. For di¤erent perspectives, see Bloch
(1996), Chwe (1994), Ferreira (1999), Gomes (1999) and Ray and Vohra (1999). We note, too,
that recent work in contracting theory (e.g., McAfee and Schwartz (1994) and Segal (1999))
explores the scope for bilateral opportunism, for settings in which binding contracts can be
written and any bargaining sequence across players is exogenously given.
15A speci…c game that can provide formal justi…cation for our focus is the following. Let us
begin from an e¢cient vector of tari¤s, which forms the status quo, and specify the rules (if any)
that govern bilateral negotiations. Then in stage 1, the home government makes each foreign
government i an o¤er (¿ i; ¿¤i) which is privately observed by foreign government i. In stage 2,
each foreign government simultaneously decides whether to accept or reject, holding “passive
beliefs” about the o¤er faced by the other foreign government (McAfee and Schwartz, 1994).
It can be shown that the outcome of this game under the rules of negotiation associated with
each of the Propositions 5, 6, 8 and 9 that follow will share the e¢ciency properties suggested
by each proposition. This interpretation builds from Segal’s (1999) analysis of contracting with
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4. Discriminatory Environments
We start with a permissive setting, in which discriminatory tari¤s are allowed.
4.1. Government Preferences in Reduced Form
To begin, we represent government welfare in reduced form as a direct function
of tari¤s. Let cW (¿ ) ´ W (p; T ) and cW ¤i(¿ ) ´ W ¤i(p¤i; epwi); where all prices and
terms of trade are evaluated at their market-clearing levels.
We now strengthen our basic assumptions slightly, so as to focus on tari¤s for
which externalities can be unambiguously signed:
Assumption 1 (Externalities): We restrict attention to tari¤s for which, for
i; j=1,2 and i 6= j :
(i). @cW=@¿ i > 0 and @cW ¤i=@¿ ¤i > 0;
(ii). @cW=@¿¤i < 0 and @cW ¤i=@¿ i < 0; and
(iii). @cW ¤i=@¿¤j > 0 and @cW ¤i=@¿ j > 0.
Thus, we will consider initial tari¤s that rest on the e¢ciency frontier at a point
where (i) each government would prefer to unilaterally raise its tari¤; (ii) each
government experiences a welfare reduction when its export good is confronted
with a higher tari¤ from a trading partner; and (iii) foreign government i is pleased
when either the home government raises its tari¤ on the exports of foreign country
j or foreign government j raises its tari¤ on the exports of the home country. These
relationships follow directly from the model of Section 2, so long as government
welfare at the initial tari¤s is su¢ciently sensitive to the terms-of-trade change
that an adjustment in tari¤s would imply.
We further note that Assumption 1 directs attention to the set of e¢cient
trade agreements that are suggested by the nature of GATT tari¤ bindings. The
essential legal commitment associated with GATT bindings is that governments
agree not to raise their tari¤s above bound levels. It would be di¢cult to reconcile
the value that governments evidently place on such commitments with points on
the e¢ciency frontier that did not satisfy assumptions (i) and (ii). And using the
model of Section 2, it can be shown that assumption (iii) is in fact implied by
(ii).16 In addition, these assumptions yield a negotiation environment in which
externalities.
16This can be seen by noting that the impact of a change in ¿¤j or ¿ j on the welfare of foreign
country i travels through epwi, as does the impact on the welfare of foreign country i of a change
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each government views a tari¤ reduction on its part as a “concession” that is
potentially appealing if a trading partner “reciprocates” with a tari¤ reduction
of its own, in line with the behavior often attributed to government trade-policy
negotiators (see, e.g., Krugman (1991, 1997)).17
4.2. Characterization of E¢cient Tari¤s
At an e¢cient set of tari¤s, no one government can gain from an adjustment in
the tari¤ vector, without simultaneously reducing the welfare of at least one other
government. An e¢cient vector of tari¤s, ¿ e ´ (¿1e; ¿2e; ¿ ¤1e ; ¿ ¤2e ), must therefore
solve the following program:
Program W : Choose ¿ to maximize cW (¿ )
s:t: cW ¤i(¿ ) ¸ cW ¤i(¿ e); for i = 1; 2:
We omit a formal analysis of this program, as the solution may be easily
characterized with the assistance of some simple …gures. We begin with a char-
acterization of the e¢cient tari¤s:
Proposition 4 (E¢cient Tari¤s): If ¿ e is an e¢cient vector of tari¤s, then
for i; j =1,2 and i 6= j, we must have that
¡@
cW=@¿ ¤i
@cW=@¿ i > ¡@
cW ¤i=@¿¤i
@cW ¤i=@¿ i > 0 > ¡@
cW ¤j=@¿ ¤i
@cW ¤j=@¿ i :
To interpret the characterization, we refer to Figure 2. With ¿ i on the vertical
axis and ¿¤i on the horizontal axis, we observe …rst that the iso-welfare curve for
in ¿ i. Our assumptions relating tari¤s to equilibrium world prices are then su¢cient to establish
that (ii) implies (iii).
17While there is broad agreement that negotiators appear to behave in this way, there is less
agreement over whether this behavior makes economic sense. See, e.g., Krugman (1991, 1997)
who argues that it does not. Our point here is simply that, within the model developed in
Section 2, there is a set of e¢cient trade agreements consistent with this behavior, and these are
the only trade agreements that are consistent as well with the basic structure of GATT tari¤
bindings. This interpretation is developed more fully in Bagwell and Staiger (1999a, 2001a).
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the home-country government is positively sloped over the relevant region. This
simply re‡ects that the home government trades o¤ a higher own tari¤ (which
is good) against a higher tari¤ from foreign country i (which is bad) when the
home-country government’s welfare is held …xed. The iso-welfare curve of the
government of foreign country i is positively sloped for the same reason. Second,
we observe that the iso-welfare curve for the government of foreign country j
is negatively sloped, since it bene…ts from an increase in either tari¤. Third,
we observe that the home-government iso-welfare curve is steeper than that of
foreign government i at the e¢cient point, and so an e¢cient tari¤ vector leaves
a lens in which the governments of the home country and foreign country i could
experience welfare gains. We note that the lens lies below the iso-welfare curve of
the government of foreign country j.
To understand the location of the lens, it is instructive to entertain the opposite
possibility in which the lens lies above the iso-welfare curve of the government of
foreign country j. If this were the case, then it would be possible to raise the two
tari¤s in a way that o¤ered gains to all three governments. The governments of the
home country and foreign country i could obviously gain from such a maneuver.
Moreover, when these governments impose higher tari¤s on each other’s exports,
foreign country j experiences a terms-of-trade gain, and under Assumption 1 this
results in a welfare improvement for the government of this country. A more subtle
possibility is that there is no lens: the iso-welfare curves of the governments of the
home country and foreign country i are tangent at the point at which they intersect
the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign country j. This arrangement
fails to solve Program W as well, but a more involved alteration of tari¤s is now
required to produce Pareto improvements. For example, raising ¿ i and ¿ ¤i along
the iso-welfare curve of foreign country i will cause the home-country government
to experience a second-order welfare loss, while generating a …rst-order welfare
bene…t for the government of foreign country j. Adjustments to ¿ j and ¿ ¤j can
then be found that ensure gains for all three governments.18 Therefore, if the
18In the tangency case, the welfares of the governments of the home country and foreign
country j can be increased while maintaining the welfare of the government of foreign country
i if we adjust tari¤s according to the following procedure: (i). increase ¿ i and ¿¤i so as to
preserve cW ¤i; thereby creating a second-order loss (…rst-order gain) for cW (cW ¤j); (ii). raise ¿ j
and lower ¿¤j so as to preserve cW ¤i, thereby creating a …rst-order gain (…rst-order loss) for cW
(cW ¤j); and (iii). ensure that the …rst adjustment is large as compared to the second, thereby
creating a net gain for cW ¤j . Speci…cally, with subscripts denoting partial derivatives, it su¢ces
to pick tari¤ changes that satisfy: d¿¤i = "i > 0; d¿ i = ¡[cW ¤i¿¤i=cW ¤i¿i ]"i > 0; d¿¤j = ¡"j < 0
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vector of tari¤s is e¢cient, then the lens indeed must lie below the iso-welfare
curve of the government of foreign country j, as depicted in Figure 2.
4.3. Bilateral Opportunism
Starting with an e¢cient tari¤ vector, we now consider the possibility of a bilateral
agreement in which the governments of the home country and some foreign country
i adjust the tari¤s under their control, (¿ i ,¿ j) and ¿ ¤i. For a given set of rules for
bilateral negotiations, we say that an initial e¢cient tari¤ vector is vulnerable to
bilateral opportunism if there exists a foreign country i and a permitted bilateral
agreement between this country and the home country such that the governments
of the home country and foreign country i both gain. We establish next that
the bilateral opportunism problem is potentially severe: without strong rules, all
e¢cient tari¤ vectors are vulnerable to bilateral opportunism.
This conclusion follows immediately when there are no rules that govern bi-
lateral negotiations. In that case, the home government could raise ¿ j as part of
its bilateral negotiation with the government of foreign country i; furthermore,
under Assumption 1, the home government and the government of foreign country
i would both gain when the home government raises ¿ j. Thus, in the absence of
any rules governing bilateral negotiations, all e¢cient tari¤ vectors are vulnerable
to bilateral opportunism.
As noted above, however, a tari¤ concession made in a previous GATT agree-
ment is “bound,” and the tari¤ therefore cannot be raised above its bound level in
a subsequent negotiation, unless the trading partner on whose exports the bound
tari¤ applies is represented. This binding restriction eliminates the potential of
the home government to raise ¿ j as part of its bilateral agreement with the gov-
ernment of foreign country i. Does the binding restriction su¢ce to eliminate the
bilateral opportunism problem?
At this point we may refer to our characterization of the e¢ciency frontier in
Figure 2. We then see that the binding restriction fails to eliminate the bilateral
opportunism problem. The governments of the home country and foreign country
i can still gain by lowering the tari¤s that they apply to one another (i.e., by
moving into the lens):
Proposition 5 (Bindings and E¢cient Tari¤s): Whether or not a bind-
and d¿ j = [cW ¤i¿¤j=cW¤i¿j ]"j > 0; where "i="j > [cW ¤j¿j =cW ¤j¿i ][cW ¤j¿¤j=cW ¤j¿j ¡cW ¤i¿¤j=cW ¤i¿j ]=[cW ¤j¿¤i=cW ¤j¿ i ¡cW ¤i¿¤i=cW ¤i¿i ] > 0:
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ings restriction is imposed, every e¢cient tari¤ vector is vulnerable to bilateral
opportunism.
As Figure 2 indicates, the key point is that, by lowering the tari¤s that they
apply to one another, the governments of the home country and foreign country
i cause a terms-of-trade loss for foreign country j. In e¤ect, the governments
of the home country and foreign country i convert this loss into their own gain,
thereby rendering vulnerable any e¢cient tari¤s, even when the tari¤ that the
home government applies to exports from foreign country j is bound.
Would the principle of reciprocity block an opportunistic bilateral agreement
of this kind? Recall from Lemma 1 that a bilateral agreement between the gov-
ernments of the home country and foreign country i that satis…es the principle of
reciprocity must leave unaltered the terms of trade between these two countries.
It is thus evident from Figure 2 that the principle of reciprocity will fail to block
an opportunistic agreement between the home country and foreign country i if
and only if the (positively sloped) iso-epwi locus passing through the e¢cient point
in Figure 2 enters the lens. As can be understood from Figure 2, when this is the
case, both the home-country government and the government of foreign country
i seek lower tari¤s and greater trade volume at the given terms of trade between
these two countries. Hence we have:
Proposition 6 (Reciprocity and E¢cient Tari¤s): Under bindings and the
principle of reciprocity, an e¢cient tari¤ vector is vulnerable to bilateral oppor-
tunism if and only if there exists i 2 f1; 2g such that the home-country government
and the government of foreign country i seek lower tari¤s and greater trade volume
at the given terms of trade between them.
As Proposition 6 con…rms, in the absence of an MFN rule, the principle of
reciprocity can solve the bilateral opportunism problem at points on the e¢ciency
frontier at which, for each bilateral relationship, one of the two governments would
seek a (weakly) higher tari¤ and less trade volume at the given terms of trade
between them. But at any point on the e¢ciency frontier where this condition is
not met, there will exist a foreign government i with whom the home government
can engage in opportunistic reciprocal liberalization. Through their liberalization,
the government of foreign country i receives a bene…cial increase in trade volume
at a …xed terms of trade between it and the home country. The home government
also bene…ts, and its bene…t is made possible by the implied reduction in epwj (i.e.,
the terms-of-trade improvement against foreign country j).
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Hence, when the principle of reciprocity is applied in a discriminatory envi-
ronment, the bilateral opportunism problem remains for a signi…cant set of points
on the e¢ciency frontier. But might instead MFN alone su¢ce? We take this up
in the next section.
5. Non-discriminatory Environment
We consider now the situation in which both the initial tari¤s and the tari¤s asso-
ciated with any future bilateral negotiation must conform to the MFN rule. This
rule alters both the e¢ciency frontier and the incentives for bilateral opportunism.
5.1. Government Preferences in Reduced Form
When the home government is restricted by the MFN requirement, the total
number of tari¤s is reduced to three: ¿ ´ ¿1 = ¿2; ¿ ¤1 and ¿¤2: For this sit-
uation, we may de…ne the reduced-form preferences for governments as follows:
W (¿ ; ¿¤1; ¿¤2) ´ cW (¿ ; ¿ ; ¿¤1; ¿¤2) ´W (p; T ) andW ¤i(¿ ; ¿ ¤1; ¿ ¤2) ´ cW ¤i(¿ ; ¿ ; ¿¤1; ¿¤2) ´
W ¤i(p¤i; epwi); where all prices and terms of trade are evaluated at their market-
clearing levels. That is, W and W
¤i
are simply cW and cW ¤i, respectively, with
the MFN constraint ¿ ´ ¿1 = ¿ 2 imposed. Recall from Section 2 that, under the
MFN restriction, there will now be a single world price, and so we also have that
T = epwi ´ epw:
In analogy with Assumption 1 for discriminatory tari¤ environments, we now
strengthen our basic assumptions, so as to focus on MFN tari¤s for which exter-
nalities can be unambiguously signed:
Assumption 1’ (Externalities: MFN): We restrict attention to tari¤s for
which, for i; j=1,2 and i 6= j :
(i). @W=@¿ > 0 and @W
¤i
=@¿¤i > 0;
(ii). @W=@¿¤i < 0 and @W ¤i=@¿ < 0; and
(iii). @W
¤i
=@¿ ¤j > 0:
Thus, we consider negotiated MFN tari¤s at which each government would prefer
to unilaterally raise its tari¤, each government experiences a welfare reduction
when its export good is confronted with a higher tari¤ from a trading partner,
and foreign government i is pleased when foreign government j raises its tari¤
on the exports of the home country. Again, this assumption directs attention
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to (MFN-e¢cient) tari¤s at which the welfare consequences of tari¤ changes are
consistent with their terms-of-trade e¤ects and with the nature of GATT bindings.
5.2. Characterization of MFN-E¢cient Tari¤s
We now characterize the set of tari¤s that are e¢cient in the MFN class. The
e¢cient tari¤s characterized in the previous section for which ¿ 1 = ¿2 are of course
also e¢cient in the MFN class, but a tari¤ vector that is e¢cient in the MFN
class need not be e¢cient in the full class of (discriminatory) tari¤ vectors. We
continue to denote the vector of tari¤s by ¿ ´ (¿ ; ¿¤1; ¿¤2), noting that in this
MFN environment ¿ now has three elements. Formally, an MFN-e¢cient vector
of tari¤s, ¿m ´ (¿m; ¿ ¤1m ; ¿ ¤2m), must solve the following program:
Program MFN¡W: Choose ¿ to maximize W (¿ )
s:t: W
¤i
(¿ ) ¸W ¤i(¿m); for i = 1; 2:
As compared to the characterization of e¢cient tari¤s when discrimination is
allowed, the lack of two independent home-country tari¤s under the restriction
of MFN complicates somewhat the characterization of the set of MFN-e¢cient
tari¤s. Consequently, while we continue to rely heavily on a series of …gures to
illustrate the main points, we provide a formal analysis of this program in the
Appendix. We establish there that:
Proposition 7 (MFN-E¢cient Tari¤s): If ¿m is an MFN-e¢cient vector of




















































With ¿ on the vertical axis and ¿ ¤i on the horizontal axis, Figures 3A, 3B
and 3C depict the implications of conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 7,
respectively. Each …gure re‡ects, at the e¢cient point, the ranking of the iso-
welfare-curve slopes of the three governments which is implied by the associated
condition (all slopes are positive by Assumption 1’). The three cases are organized
on the basis of whether the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign country
j 6= i is steeper than (case (i)), ‡atter than (case (ii)), or tangent to (case (iii)) the
iso-welfare curve of the home government. The essential content of Proposition
7 may be seen with the aid of these …gures, once it is observed that, in (¿ , ¿¤i)
space, the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign country j 6= i is also
the iso-epw locus, and that any movement to the right of this locus raises epw or
equivalently (by Assumption 1’) bene…ts the government of foreign country j.
As a consequence, in case (i) the government of the home country seeks a
higher tari¤ and less trade volume, given the world price (i.e., moving along the
iso-welfare curve of foreign government j), with its preferred outcome for the given
world price occurring at the point of tangency H in Figure 3A. As we demonstrate
in the Appendix, e¢ciency then requires that each foreign country would gain from
lowering its tari¤ and achieving more trade volume, if the world price were …xed.
Similarly, in case (ii) the government of the home country seeks a lower tari¤ and
more trade volume, given the world price (i.e., moving along the iso-welfare curve
of foreign government j), with its preferred outcome for the given world price
occurring at the point of tangency L in Figure 3B, and e¢ciency then requires
that each foreign country seek a higher tari¤ and less trade volume at the given
world price. Finally, in case (iii) the government of the home country achieves its
preferred trade volume given the world price, and e¢ciency requires that at least
one foreign government also achieve its preferred trade volume.
The downward lens in Figure 3A can be understood intuitively as follows. If
the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign country j 6= i is steeper than
the iso-welfare curve of the home government (case (i)), then an upward lens
between the home government and the government of foreign country i would
have to contain, or lie to the right of, the iso-welfare curve of the government of
foreign country j. But this would not be compatible with e¢ciency, because it
would then be feasible to move into the lens and bene…t all three governments.
The absence of a lens (i.e., a tangency) between the home government and the
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government of foreign country i is also incompatible with e¢ciency in case (i).19
The upward lens described in Figure 3B can be similarly understood. If the
iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign country j 6= i is ‡atter than the iso-
welfare curve of the home government (case (ii)), then a downward lens between
the home government and the government of foreign country i would have to
contain, or lie to the right of, the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign
country j. But again, this would not be compatible with e¢ciency, because it
would then be feasible to move into the lens and bene…t all three governments.
The absence of a lens between the home government and the government of foreign
country i is also incompatible with e¢ciency in case (ii).20
Finally, if the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign country j 6= i is
tangent to the iso-welfare curve of the home government (case (iii)), then the home
government achieves its preferred trade volume at the given world price, and the
presence of a lens between the home government and the government of foreign
country i no longer signals the possibility of Pareto-improving tari¤ changes. As a
consequence, each of the possibilities illustrated in Figure C (a downward lens, an
upward lens, or no lens at all) can arise at points on the e¢ciency frontier. To see
this, consider why the downward-lens case (illustrated in the top panel of Figure
3C) cannot be improved upon. In this case, the government of foreign country i
seeks a lower tari¤ and greater trade volume at the given world price. A natural
candidate for generating a Pareto improvement would be to …rst reduce ¿ and ¿¤i
slightly along the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign country j, creating
a …rst-order gain for the government of foreign country i and a second-order loss
for the home government. The problem is, there are not su¢cient instruments to
then undo the home government’s second-order loss, because the government of
foreign country j cannot receive a lower world price without su¤ering a welfare
decline, while the home government must receive a lower world price if its second-
19To see this, hypothesize a tangency and consider the following two-step procedure. First,
increase ¿ and ¿¤i slightly along the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign country i,
creating a …rst-order gain for the government of foreign country j (via the rise in epw) and a
second-order loss for the home government. Second, raise ¿ and ¿¤j slightly along the iso-welfare
curve of the government of foreign country i (i.e., along the new iso-epw locus), so as to eliminate
the second-order welfare loss while preserving a …rst-order welfare gain for the government of
foreign country j (recall that this is the direction preferred by the home government in case (i)).
This two-step procedure would yield a Pareto improvement over the initial tari¤s, and hence
the absence of a lens between the home government and the government of foreign country i is
also incompatible with e¢ciency in case (i).
20This can be seen by considering the two-step procedure described in note 19, with the
direction of tari¤ movements reversed.
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order loss is to be o¤set (while maintaining a …rst-order gain for the government
of foreign country j). Hence, no Pareto improvement is possible.
Observe that the bottom panel of Figure 3C depicts the case in which all
governments are content with the trade volumes achieved at the given world prices.
There is thus no lens in this case. The tari¤s that support such an arrangement are
of special interest, as they correspond to the tari¤s that governments would choose
were they to “ignore” any terms-of-trade e¤ects of their tari¤ choices. Further,
in the special case in which governments maximize national income, these tari¤s
correspond to multilateral free trade. In Bagwell and Staiger (1999a, 2001a), we
interpret these tari¤s in greater detail, and we refer to the MFN-tari¤ vector at
which each government achieves its preferred trade volume given the world price
as the MFN politically optimal tari¤s. We follow that convention here as well.
5.3. Bilateral Opportunism
We now consider the circumstances under which an initial vector of MFN-e¢cient
tari¤s is vulnerable to bilateral opportunism, when the bilateral agreement must
honor the MFN rule.
Consider …rst Figure 3A. In this case, the MFN-e¢cient tari¤ vector is vul-
nerable, as the home government and the government of foreign country i can
negotiate a further reduction in ¿ and ¿ ¤i which yields a Pareto gain for them
(i.e., moves them into the lens in Figure 3A) at the expense of the government of
foreign country j, who su¤ers a terms-of-trade decline. Hence, for MFN-e¢cient
tari¤ vectors at which the home government seeks a higher tari¤ and reduced
trade volume at the given world price, there is a bilateral opportunism problem.
Notice, too, that this problem remains when the bilateral negotiations must honor
the MFN rule as well as a bindings requirement.
This case is of some special interest. The government of foreign country
j is harmed, even though it does not alter its own tari¤ and receives a non-
discriminatory tari¤ reduction from the home country. And the governments of
foreign country i and the home country are able to convert this loss into their own
gain. Intuitively, foreign country j is harmed by a deterioration in its terms of
trade: the tari¤ reduction given by foreign country i raises the cost of home ex-
ports in foreign country j, and this negative e¤ect can be engineered to overwhelm
the bene…cial e¤ect of a reduced home tari¤ on exports from foreign country j.
The government of foreign country j thus experiences a welfare loss, despite the
fact that its exports from foreign country j confront a lower home-country tari¤.
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To understand how the home government and the government of foreign coun-
try i can gain from this maneuver, recall that in this case the governments of
the foreign countries each desire greater trade, given the world price, while the
government of the home country does not. The home government, however, will
accept a greater bilateral trade volume if this comes with an improved terms of
trade. In a bilateral negotiation, this can be accomplished if the government of
foreign country i reduces its tari¤ “more” than does the government of the home
country (corresponding to a move into the lens in Figure 3A).
Consider next Figure 3B. Here the government of the home country seeks a
reduced tari¤ and more trade volume at the given world price, while the govern-
ment of each foreign country seeks less trade volume. In this case, the government
of the home country will accept less bilateral trade volume as part of a bilateral
trade agreement, if the volume reduction comes with an improved terms of trade.
This will be the case, if the home country’s tari¤ increases “more” than does that
of foreign country i. As a consequence of this bilateral maneuver, foreign country
j experiences a terms of trade loss and a consequent welfare decline. In this way,
the upward lens represents a gain that the governments of the home country and
foreign country i may enjoy at the expense of the government of foreign country
j. In the absence of bindings, therefore, this tari¤ vector is vulnerable to bilat-
eral opportunism. On the other hand, in the presence of a bindings restriction,
¿ cannot be increased, and hence the tari¤ vector is not vulnerable. Therefore,
for MFN-e¢cient tari¤ vectors at which the home government seeks more trade
volume at the given world price, there is a bilateral opportunism problem if and
only if bindings are absent.
Finally, consider Figure 3C. In this case, the home government achieves its
preferred trade volume at the given world price, and e¢ciency then requires as
well that at least one of the foreign governments, say j, must achieve its preferred
trade volume at the given world price as well. The top panel of the …gure de-
picts the case in which foreign government i seeks greater trade volume at the
given world price. The governments of the home country and foreign country
i then face circumstances analogous to those of the home country and foreign
country i in Figure 3A, and thus there is a bilateral opportunism problem with or
without bindings. The middle panel of Figure 3C depicts the case in which for-
eign government i seeks reduced trade volume at the given world price, and here
the governments of the home country and foreign country i face circumstances
analogous to those of the home country and foreign country i in Figure 3B. Con-
sequently, there is then a bilateral opportunism problem if and only if bindings
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are absent. Finally, the bottom panel of Figure 3C depicts the case in which
foreign government i also achieves its preferred trade volume at the given world
price. This is the case of MFN politically optimal tari¤s. As the bottom panel
of Figure 3C makes clear, the MFN politically optimal tari¤ vector exhibits no
lens, and hence it is not vulnerable to bilateral opportunism whether or not bind-
ings are imposed. Hence, for MFN politically optimal tari¤s, there is no bilateral
opportunism problem, regardless of the presence of bindings.
We may now state:
Proposition 8 (MFN and E¢cient Tari¤s):
(A). Under the MFN Rule, an MFN-e¢cient tari¤ vector is not vulnerable to
bilateral opportunism if and only if it is politically optimal.
(B). Under bindings and the MFN Rule, an MFN-e¢cient tari¤ vector is not
vulnerable to bilateral opportunism if and only if: (i) the home government seeks
a lower tari¤ and greater trade volume, given the world price; or (ii) the home
government achieves its preferred trade volume given the world price, and neither
foreign country seeks a lower tari¤ and greater trade volume given the world price.
As Proposition 8 indicates, the MFN rule on its own o¤ers only a partial solution
to the bilateral opportunism problem. In the absence of bindings, the MFN rule
guarantees that exactly one MFN-e¢cient tari¤ vector is protected from bilateral
opportunism; and even when the MFN rule is joined with a bindings restriction,
a subset of MFN-e¢cient tari¤ vectors (namely, those in which the government of
the home country seeks less trade volume at …xed world prices) remain vulnerable.
As a general matter, then, if the welfare of non-participating governments is to
be protected, the rules of bilateral negotiation must be strengthened beyond the
MFN (plus bindings) requirement.
By contrast, if the MFN rule were combined with the reciprocity rule, then the
welfare of the non-participating government would be preserved in the face of any
bilateral agreement, and so no MFN-e¢cient tari¤ vector would be vulnerable to
bilateral opportunism. In terms of Figures 3A-3C, reciprocity restricts bilateral
negotiations between the domestic government and the government of foreign
country i to remain along the iso-W
¤j
(equivalently, iso-epw) locus, which never
enters the lens between them. When joined with Proposition 8, this observation
suggests that the principle of reciprocity serves to enhance signi…cantly the power
of the principle of non-discrimination in dealing with bilateral opportunism.
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6. Non-violation Nulli…cation-or-Impairment
While we have above modeled MFN and reciprocity as formal and rigid rules,
their application in GATT/WTO practice is more quali…ed. But non-participant
welfare may also be protected through other GATT/WTO provisions. We ana-
lyze here the potential role of GATT Article XXIII non-violation nulli…cation-or-
impairment complaints in protecting non-participant welfare.21 We ask whether
the nulli…cation-or-impairment rule might provide a separate defense against bi-
lateral opportunism, even when the reciprocity and MFN rules are not imposed.22
Our analysis requires a de…nition of market access. To begin, we thus return to
the underlying model in Section 2. Consider a given vector of tari¤s, ¿ : Using the
linkage condition (2.1), we may de…ne the function pwiL (¿
i; ¿ j ; pwj) ´ [¿ j=¿ i]pwj:
With this de…nition, the domestic country’s terms of trade may be expressed as
a function of ¿ and pwj:
TL(¿ ; p
wj) ´ T (p¤j; p¤i; pwj ; pwiL );
where p¤j ´ p¤j(¿ ¤j ; pwj) and p¤i ´ p¤i(¿¤i; pwiL ): For a given vector of tari¤s ¿ ,
the market access that the domestic country a¤ords to foreign country j at world
price pwj then may be de…ned as:
MAj(¿ ; pwj) ´M(p; TL)¡ E¤i(p¤i; pwiL ) (6.1)
where p ´ p(¿ j ; pwj).23 E¤ectively, this amounts to the “residual” import demand
21Nulli…cation-or-impairment complaints may be lodged under Article XXIII, if it is alleged
that an explicit GATT rule (e.g., MFN) has been broken (“violation complaints”) and even if no
such allegation is made (“non-violation complaints”). In practice, when a measure is found to
be GATT-illegal, it is presumed to cause nulli…cation or impairment, and thus for a successful
violation complaint no further conditions are required (see, e.g., Roessler, 1997, p. 129). We
describe in the Introduction the conditions that must be met for a successful non-violation
complaint (see, e.g., Petersmann, 1997, p. 162), and it is on this possibility that we focus.
22A second reason for considering non-violation nulli…cation-or-impairment provisions in the
context of bilateral opportunism problems is that new complications arise when many goods
are considered. In our working paper (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999c), we show that MFN and
reciprocity continue to solve the terms-of-trade driven bilateral opportunism problem, but an
additional problem of bilateral opportunism (associated with local price movements) may still
arise under these rules in limited circumstances. In this light, a limited role for non-violation
complaints could arise in a many-good setting even if reciprocity and MFN were rigidly applied.
23We may similarly de…ne the market access that foreign country j a¤ords to exporters from
the domestic country at world price pwj . This is given simply by foreign country j0s import
demand at pwj in light of its tari¤ ¿¤j : MA¤j(¿¤j ; pwj) ´M¤j(p¤j ; pwj):
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faced by exporters from foreign country j at ¿ and pwj. Note that the market-
clearing condition (2.4) now may be rewritten equivalently as:
MAj(¿ ; pwj) = E¤j(p¤j; pwj): (6.2)
Under market clearing, the market access that the domestic country o¤ers ex-
porters from foreign country j equals the export supply from foreign country j.
We next observe a relationship between changes in the terms of trade and
changes in market access. In a two-country model, the Marshall-Lerner (global)
stability condition ensures that an inward shift of the domestic import demand
curve at every world price results in a lower equilibrium world price. We assume
the analogous stability condition in our three-country model.24 In a discriminatory
setting, this means that a reduction in the market access that the domestic country
a¤ords to foreign country j at every pwj – engineered with any combination of
changes in (¿ i; ¿ j) and ¿ ¤i – results in a lower epwj. In an MFN environment, this
means that a reduction in the market access that the domestic country a¤ords
to foreign country j at every pw – engineered with any combination of changes
in ¿ and ¿¤i – results in a lower epw. In both environments, the Marshall-Lerner
stability condition ensures that, for a given vector of tari¤s, the equilibrium world
price (i.e., the world price that satis…es (6.2)) is uniquely determined.
We now return to our consideration of bilateral negotiations, and consider the
possible role of non-violation nulli…cation-or-impairment complaints in preventing
the problem of bilateral opportunism. As detailed in GATT Article XXIII, these
complaints can be lodged when a government believes that market access it had
previously won through negotiations is subsequently denied unexpectedly as a
result of measures taken by its negotiating partner. In principle the ability to
bring such complaints could prevent the domestic country and foreign country i
from negotiating in a way which reclaimed from foreign country j a portion of the
domestic market access that country j had previously negotiated. More formally,
we may say that bilateral negotiations between the domestic country and foreign
country i satisfy the nulli…cation-or-impairment rule whenever
MAj(¿N ; epwjI ) ¸MAj(¿ I ; epwjI ): (6.3)
24Formally, in a two-country setting the Marshall-Lerner stability condition requires that,
at the equilibrium world price, the elasticity of the home-country’s import demand must be
less than the elasticity of the foreign country’s export supply. We impose here the analogous
condition that, at the equilibrium world price de…ned by (6.2), the elasticity of the market access
that the home-country a¤ords to foreign country j must be less than the elasticity of foreign
country j’s export supply.
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But under our stability condition, bilateral negotiations between the domestic
country and foreign country i that satisfy the nulli…cation-or-impairment rule in
discriminatory environments must not diminish epwj, while under the MFN rule
such negotiations must not diminish epw. As movement into the lens described
in Figure 2 requires a diminished epwj, while movement into the lens’ described
by 3A, 3B and 3C all require a diminished epw, it follows that, beginning from
the e¢ciency frontier, all opportunistic bilateral agreements are indeed precluded
under the nulli…cation-or-impairment rule. That is, starting from an e¢cient set of
tari¤s, any bilateral agreement that is attractive to the home country and foreign
country i would violate the nulli…cation-or-impairment rule. Thus we have:
Proposition 9 (Nulli…cation-or-Impairment Rule and E¢cient Tari¤s):
Under the nulli…cation-or-impairment rule, no e¢cient tari¤ vector is vulnerable
to bilateral opportunism.
Using Proposition 9, we have a formal basis from which to interpret the
nulli…cation-or-impairment rule as playing a potentially important role in solv-
ing the bilateral opportunism problem, regardless of whether the MFN and/or
reciprocity rules are present. But the nulli…cation-or-impairment rule would by
itself be a cumbersome solution to a problem which, as Proposition 5 indicates,
is pervasive. In this light, we may conclude from Propositions 3, 5, 6, 8 and 9
that MFN and reciprocity together can provide a …rst line of defense against the
prospect of bilateral agreements that appropriate welfare from non-participants.
The nulli…cation-or-impairment rule can then be understood as providing a second
line of defense against the prospect of non-participant welfare appropriation, as
it need only be invoked when a bilateral negotiation does not conform with each
of these principles.
7. Conclusion
Trade negotiations occur over time between many governments. Given the on-
going nature of such negotiations, a government may naturally fear that the extent
of market access that it has secured in a current negotiation may be diminished in
a future negotiation to which it is not party. Indeed, if a government recognizes
the potential for an opportunistic bilateral negotiation in the future, then it may
be unwilling to o¤er signi…cant concessions in a current negotiation. As this
discussion suggests, the degree to which the rules of a multilateral trading system
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protect through time the value of concessions is of central importance to the
functioning of the system.
In this paper, we o¤er a formal analysis that characterizes the scope for oppor-
tunistic bilateral agreements under di¤erent negotiation rules. Our main …nding
is that the welfare of a non-participating government is preserved in the presence
of any bilateral agreement that respects the principles of reciprocity and non-
discrimination. We thus argue that reciprocity and non-discrimination, two of
the central pillars of the GATT/WTO architecture, constitute a powerful …rst-
line of defense against the potential for opportunistic bilateral agreements.
We consider as well the possibilities for opportunism under weaker rules. We
…nd that the potential for opportunistic bilateral agreements is severe when there
are no rules: every e¢cient tari¤ vector is vulnerable to bilateral opportunism in
the absence of rules for bilateral negotiation. In addition, we …nd that the possibil-
ity of bilateral opportunism remains when either reciprocity or non-discrimination
(but not both) is imposed. Of particular interest, non-discrimination without
reciprocity o¤ers at best a partial solution to the bilateral opportunism prob-
lem: when tari¤s on non-participants are bound, the non-discrimination principle
ensures that many - but certainly not all – MFN-e¢cient tari¤ vectors are not
vulnerable to bilateral opportunism. Thus, while our results con…rm the general
point raised by Schwartz and Sykes (1997) that the non-discrimination principle
is bene…cial as a means to protect the value of past concessions, our formal analy-
sis reveals that this principle fully solves the bilateral opportunism problem only
when it is applied in combination with the principle of reciprocity.
The …ndings here suggest that reciprocity, which is often maligned as a mer-
cantilist distraction, in fact serves a key role in trade negotiations when exer-
cised in the presence of non-discrimination. At the same time, preferential tari¤
agreements, which are permitted under the special exception to MFN granted
by GATT’s Article XXIV, represent a possible route to opportunistic bilateral
agreements. In this light, preferential tari¤ agreements may present a natural
and appropriate target for non-violation nulli…cation-or-impairment complaints,
and the ability to bring such complaints through Article XXIII may in turn play
an important role in diminishing the attractiveness of preferential agreements
as a route to bilateral opportunism. More generally, our analysis suggests that
the potential for nulli…cation-or-impairment complaints can constitute a valuable
second-line of defense against bilateral opportunism.
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9. Appendix
The Two-Good General-Equilibrium Model of Trade:
The import and export functions for foreign country i may be derived as




k = x; y. Consumption is a function of the local relative price - which de…nes the
trade-o¤ faced by consumers and determines the level and distribution of factor
income in the economy - and of tari¤ revenue R¤i, which is distributed lump-sum
to the consumers in foreign country i and which we measure in units of their export
good y at local prices: D¤ik = D
¤i
k (p
¤i; R¤i) for k = x; y. Tari¤ revenue is de…ned
implicitly by R¤i = [D¤iy (p
¤i; R¤i)¡Q¤iy (p¤i)][1=p¤i ¡ 1=pwi] or R¤i = R¤i(p¤i; pwi),
and is increasing in foreign country i’s terms of trade, under the assumption that
goods are normal. National consumption for foreign country i can thus be written
as C¤ik (p
¤i; pwi) ´ D¤ik (p¤i; R¤i(p¤i; pwi)) for k = x; y: Finally, for foreign country i,
imports of good y are represented as M¤i(p¤i; pwi) ´ C¤iy (p¤i; pwi)¡Q¤iy (p¤i), and
exports of good x are given as E¤i(p¤i; pwi) ´ Q¤ix (p¤i)¡ C¤ix (p¤i; pwi):
Consider next the home country. Domestic production is determined by the
local price: Qk = Qk(p) for k = x; y. Domestic consumption of each good is
likewise determined as a function of the local price and domestic tari¤ revenue:
Dk(p;R) for k = x; y, where tari¤ revenue is distributed lump-sum to domestic
consumers and measured in units of the domestic export good x in local prices.




s¤i(p¤1; p¤2; pw1; pw2)¢(p¡pwi) = [Dx(p;R)¡Qx(p)]¢[p¡T ];
or R = R(p; T ). We now may represent the domestic country’s consumption as
Ck(p; T ) ´ Dk(p;R(p; T )) for k = x; y: Home-country imports of x thus may be
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denoted as M(p; T ) ´ Cx(p; T )¡Qx(p); while home-country exports of y may be
represented as E(p; T ) ´ Qy(p)¡ Cy(p; T ):
Proof of Proposition 7 (MFN-E¢cient Tari¤s): To prove this proposition,
we …rst identify some general relationships and then establish three lemmas. Here
and throughout the Appendix, we denote partial derivatives by subscripts. We
observe that for every i; j 2 f1; 2g with i 6= j, we have:
(A1). W ¿ = [Wp¿ +Wpw ]
@epw
@¿
+Wp epw > 0





































where the expressions are signed in accordance with Assumption 1’. Using these
expressions, we next derive that:



















¿¤i¡W ¤j¿ =W ¤j¿¤i =W ¤i¿ =W ¤i¿¤i¡@epw@¿ = @epw@¿¤i = [W ¤ip¤i( 1¿¤i )2epw=W ¤i¿¤i][@epw@¿ = @epw@¿¤i ]
(A10). W ¿¤i=W ¿¤j ¡W ¤i¿¤i=W ¤i¿¤j = @epw@¿¤i= @epw@¿¤j ¡W ¤i¿¤i=W ¤i¿¤j = W ¤ip¤i( 1¿¤i )2epw=W ¤i¿¤j :
We consider next the …rst-order conditions of Program MFN ¡ W . At an
MFN-e¢cient tari¤ vector, there must exist multipliers ¸1 ¸ 0 and ¸2 ¸ 0 such
that:
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As we observed in the text discussion following Proposition 7, cases (i), (ii) and
(iii) correspond to the cases in which the home government, respectively, seeks less,
seeks more or achieves its desired trade volume at the given world price. In terms
of our representation of government objective functions, these cases correspond
to the conditions that: Wp > 0, Wp < 0 and Wp = 0. To characterize the
MFN-e¢ciency frontier, we proceed exhaustively through these three cases. Our
…ndings are summarized in the following three lemmas:
Lemma A1: Suppose Wp > 0 at an MFN-e¢cient set of tari¤s. Then, for every

















and W ¤ip¤i > 0:
Proof: Given Wp > 0, the …rst inequality follows directly from Assumption 1’
and (A8), once it is observed that, in (¿ , ¿ ¤i) space, the iso-welfare curve of the
government of foreign country j 6= i is also the iso-epw locus. To establish the
other inequalities, we use the …rst order conditions for ¿ (i.e., (A11)) and ¿ ¤i (i.e.,
(A12) or (A13), as appropriate) to solve for ¸j and ¸i. Using (A7), these solutions
may be written as:






¿¤i ¡W ¿=W ¿¤i ]=[@epw@¿ = @epw@¿¤i ¡W ¤i¿ =W ¤i¿¤i ]
(A15). ¸i = [W ¿¤i=W
¤i
¿¤i][W ¿=W ¿¤i ¡ @epw@¿ = @epw@¿¤i ]=[@epw@¿ = @epw@¿¤i ¡W ¤i¿ =W ¤i¿¤i]:
As ¸i must be non-negative and …nite, the …rst inequality established above to-









which under (A9) is equivalent to W ¤ip¤i > 0.
It remains to show that ¡W ¿¤i=W ¿ > ¡W ¤i¿¤i=W ¤i¿ . Using (A14), (A16) and
Assumption 1’, we see that ¸i ¸ 0 requires ¡W ¿¤i=W ¿ ¸ ¡W ¤i¿¤i=W ¤i¿ , and so we
have only to eliminate the case of equality. To this end, we use the …rst order
conditions for ¿¤j and ¿ ¤i to solve for ¸j and ¸i. Then using (A6), we calculate
that ¸j may also be expressed as






¿¤i ¡ @epw@¿¤j = @epw@¿¤i ]=[W ¤j¿¤j=W ¤j¿¤i ¡W ¤i¿¤j=W ¤i¿¤i]:


































Let us now suppose that ¡W ¿¤i=W ¿ = ¡W ¤i¿¤i=W ¤i¿ . Then given (A16) we see









which under (A10) requires W ¤ip¤i = 0. But this contradicts our …nding above that




¿ , and the lemma is proved.
Lemma A2: Suppose Wp < 0 at an MFN-e¢cient set of tari¤s. Then, for every
















and W ¤ip¤i < 0:
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Proof: GivenWp < 0, the …rst inequality follows directly from Assumption 1’ and














¡W ¿¤i=W ¿ . Finally, suppose ¡W ¤i¿¤i=W ¤i¿ = ¡W ¿¤i=W ¿ . Then, using (A18)
we may again derive that (A19) must hold, whence under (A10) it follows that
W ¤ip¤i = 0, a contradiction.
Lemma A3: Suppose Wp = 0 at an MFN-e¢cient set of tari¤s. Then for every



















and there exists j 2 f1; 2g such that W ¤jp¤j = 0:
Proof: Given Wp = 0, the …rst equality follows directly from (A8). Consider
next the second equality. Using the …rst equality just derived, the necessary


























But the …rst term is positive, under (A9) (after reversing the “i’s” and “j’s”) the
second term is zero if and only if W ¤jp¤j = 0, and under (A10) the third term is
zero if and only if W ¤ip¤i = 0. Since the second or third term (or both) must be
zero, the lemma follows.
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